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MANAGING WATER RIGHTS USING
FISHING RIGHTS AS A MODEL
SHELLEY ROSS SAXER

*

I. INTRODUCTION
Water sustains life. Living creatures, plants, and habitats compete
for sustenance, while the relationships among these interests intertwine
when we view water from the human lens. Water supports fish, and fish
provide culture, beauty, and nutrition. Water also supports natural
habitats, plant life, living creatures, and crops to feed the world.
Additionally, water creates hydropower, supports industrial processes,
carries away waste, and cleanses the bodies of all forms of life. When
there is insufficient water to support these needs, competition becomes
fierce and many life-affecting choices must be made. But who will make
these choices?
Historically, when water was abundant, it was distributed based
1
upon first-in-time concepts. Similarly, when the ocean was bountiful,
fishermen could take whatever they could capture. The public trust
doctrine serves as the governing legal framework for managing both of
these resources.
Water is fluid and too unlike land to be treated as a property interest
held by private parties. Instead, the public trust doctrine provides that
2
water should be held by the state in trust for the public good. The right
to use water owned by the public is analogous to the right to use other
natural resources, and such a right to use should be considered a

* Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. B.S., 1980, Pepperdine
University, Seaver College; J.D., 1989, University of California Los Angeles. The author
thanks Professor Kali Murray for her invitation to participate in this AALS symposium. The
author also thanks Professor David Sandino for his expert review and helpful comments, as
well as Erica Deutsch and Jennifer Lisankis for their excellent research and editing assistance.
1. Tom Tietenberg, Tradable Permits in Principle and Practice, 14 PENN ST. ENVTL. L.
REV. 251, 270 (2006).
2. See, e.g., Esplanade Properties, LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2002)
(noting that under Washington law, the public trust doctrine reserves a public property
interest in tidelands and the waters flowing over them for the public good, and despite the
sale of these lands into private ownership, the state may not give away or convey this
interest).
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revocable license or permit. Given that environmental changes make
water an unstable resource from season to season and year to year, a
method is needed to figure out how water rights should be allocated.
One option is to look to another natural resource with similar
4
characteristics: fish. Fish are not confined to a set location, they do not
observe state or national boundaries, and their numbers vary from
season to season and year to year, requiring management and allocation
in times of scarcity.
A water right is a usufructuary right and, although it entitles the
right holder to “a vested interest in that right, the right itself is
something less than the full ownership of property because it is a right
5
not to the corpus of the water but to the use of the water.” Because the
right is defined as a usufruct, the water user has a right to enjoy the
6
water, but the property ownership belongs to the state. In Estate of
Hage v. United States (Hage V), the Court of Federal Claims explained
this with a comparison to real property:
It is important to . . . note the difference between water

3. See Jan G. Laitos & Richard A. Westfall, Government Interference with Private
Interests in Public Resources, 11 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987) (“A private party may
also acquire from the federal government the revocable right to use a public resource, often
to the exclusion of others, in the form of a license or permit.”). The appropriative system,
which most states use to allocate water rights, establishes that water rights are not connected
with land ownership, and that the first person to use the water for a beneficial purpose has the
right to continue using the same quality of water for that same purpose. Montana v.
Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765, 1772 (2011). Thus, the first-in-time concept of distribution is an
integral part of this system. See Tietenberg, supra note 1, at 270. The appropriative doctrine,
however, differs from the riparian system: the riparian system allocates water based upon
whoever owns the land that abuts the water source, so the first-in-time concept does not apply
to a pure riparian system. Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Evolution of Riparianism in the United
States, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 53, 55 (2011); Todd S. Hageman, Note, Franco-American
Charolaise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water Board: The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s Resurrection of
Riparian Rights Leaves Municipal Water Supplies High and Dry, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 183, 184
(1994).
4. See Tietenberg, supra note 1, at 268.
5. Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes, 98 F.2d 308, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (holding that the
valuable nature of the privilege to graze, which would ultimately ripen into a permit under
the Act, was subject to equitable protection against an illegal act); see also Sandra B. Zellmer
& Jessica Harder, Unbundling Property in Water, 59 ALA. L. REV. 679, 697 (2008) (“[A]
water right does not constitute ownership of the water itself; it is instead usufructuary, or ‘a
right to use water.’” (quoting John C. Peck, Title and Related Considerations in Conveying
Kansas Water Rights, J. KAN. B.A., Nov. 1997, at 38, 39)).
6. For example, “under California law[,] the title to water always remains with the
state.” Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 318 (2001).
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ownership and real property ownership; water is a usufructuary
as opposed to a possessory right. Whereas real property
ownership is defined by a right to exclude others from that
property, water ownership is defined by the right to access and
7
use that water.
Government ownership of this public communal resource obligates the
8
sovereign, as a trustee, to protect the resource for the public.
Government ownership may also facilitate efficient use by private
9
individuals through the use of market principles.
As with fishing rights, the right to use water should be treated as a
revocable license. Under this method, the government would hold
water in trust. The public trust system requires a usage fee from all
10
private actors wishing to use the public resource. If the government
permits a private individual or entity to enjoy a public resource—such as
water, fish, wildlife, grazing, timber, minerals, or other public rights held
in trust—ownership is not conferred, but instead the user would pay the
public for this right. This Article addresses the need to view water rights
as licenses subject to government revocation, without just compensation,
in the same way that fishing rights are viewed as licenses subject to
government management.
The methods for managing and allocating water vary by state and
11
region. Similarly, the methods for managing and allocating fish vary by
state, region, type of fish, and the water resource within which they
reside. For comparison purposes, Part II focuses specifically on the
methods used to address water resource allocation in the Sacramento–
San Joaquin River Delta in California, and Part III looks at fish
allocation issues in the Pacific Northwest. Part IV explores property
7. 82 Fed. Cl. 202, 211 (2008).
8. Zellmer & Harder, supra note 5, at 693 (discussing the Roman, English, and early
American law recognition of the public trust over water and the universal regard for this
public resource).
9. See Josh Eagle, A Window into the Regulated Commons: The Takings Clause,
Investment Security, and Sustainability, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 654 (2007) (“In order for
government ownership to succeed, management institutions must take into account the
incentives of the entrepreneurs embedded within them.”).
10. See Reza Dibadj, Regulatory Givings and the Anticommons, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1041,
1110 (2003).
11. Shelley R. Saxer, The Fluid Nature of Property Rights in Water, 21 DUKE ENVTL. L.
& POL’Y F. 49, 51 (2010); see also Zellmer & Harder, supra note 5, at 681 (describing how
interests in water are different in the West and the East in the United States); Dellapenna,
supra note 3, at 53–55 (same).
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rights in water and fish, particularly in regard to Fifth Amendment
takings challenges when government regulations diminish water rights
and fishing rights. Takings claims require the existence of a property
right; and while the water rights claims for a taking have had mixed
success, the fishing rights claims have been uniformly rejected by courts
12
on the basis that these license rights are not considered property.
This Article concludes by recognizing that both water and fish
resources should be managed as ecosystems and governed by the public
trust doctrine “to manage and protect [these resources] in a sustainable
13
fashion . . . for the benefit of current and future generations.”
Allowing private property rights in either fish or water may violate the
public trust doctrine by giving away public resources to private
14
interests.
But, as this Article suggests, the conservation and
preservation of the right to water (as a public resource) may be
maintained by viewing water rights as similar to fishing rights.
II. ALLOCATING WATER IN CALIFORNIA
California has a storied history of water rights and the fight for water
in the arid West. While the history is fascinating, this Article focuses on
the Golden State’s equally fascinating current system of surface water
allocation from the Sacramento–San Joaquin River Delta.
The
California system of water rights is a hybrid legal regime, meshing
riparian rights with the prior appropriation doctrine. Riparian rights are
based on ownership of land adjacent to the water source and are given
priority over rights acquired based on first usage under the prior
15
appropriation system.
Appropriative water rights require that a
12. See infra notes 135–39 and accompanying text.
13. Mary Turnipseed et al., The Silver Anniversary of the United States’ Exclusive
Economic Zone: Twenty-Five Years of Ocean Use and Abuse, and the Possibility of a Blue
Water Public Trust Doctrine, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 70 (2009); see also United States v.
Washington, 573 F.3d 701, 703 (9th Cir. 2009) (“What matters for this case is that the treaties
also reserved to the tribes the ‘right of taking fish . . . in common with all citizens of the
United States.’” (quoting Treaty of Point No Point art. IV, Jan. 26, 1855, 12 Stat. 933, 934));
Saxer, supra note 11, at 51 (arguing that states should treat water as a public resource by only
granting usufructuary rights insofar as it does not interfere with the public good).
14. See Turnipseed et al., supra note 13, at 65–66.
15. Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674, 732 (Cal. 1886). This California Supreme Court case is the
basis for the hybrid California water allocation system. Currently, when there is a conflict
between a riparian right, which was first in time as dictated by the title of the land, and an
appropriation, the riparian right takes precedent. Id.; see also United States v. Fallbrook Pub.
Utility Dist., 101 F. Supp. 298, 302–06 (S.D. Cal. 1951) (affirming that Lux still
applies)Pleasant Valley Canal Co. v. Borror, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 8–9 (Ct. App. 1998)
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“beneficial use” of the water be made in order to obtain a license from
16
the State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB). While water is
17
considered to be the property of the State of California, individuals and
entities can acquire rights to use the water based upon owning riparian
18
19
property or putting the water to a beneficial use.
The SWRCB has authority to control, appropriate, use, and
20
distribute state waters. It is the state agency responsible for granting
water permits to the federal water projects managed by the Bureau of
Reclamation (BOR) and the state water projects managed by the
21
Department of Water Resources (DWR). The federal Central Valley
Project (CVP) and the State Water Project (SWP) facilitate the transfer
22
of water from northern California to the drier parts of the state. These
projects draw water from the same location at the southern edge of the
Sacramento–San Joaquin Delta to supply the “end-users in Southern
23
California.”
The federal BOR and the state DWR manage the CVP and SWP
projects by contracting with local water agencies to allow the districts

(indicating that Lux is still the general standard in California and the hybrid system remains
intact). However, if the appropriation was first in time, then that right has seniority. Lux, 10
P. at 733–34.
16. Gregory E. Good, Administrative Adjudication of Riparian Water Rights in
California After Imperial Irrigation District v. State Water Resources Control Board,
19 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 379, 380–82 & n.6 (1989) (quoting CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2).
17. CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 1992) (“All water within the State is the property of
the people of the State, but the right to the use of water may be acquired by appropriation in
the manner provided by law.”).
18. Id. § 101.
19. Id. § 100 (“The right to water or to the use or flow of water in or from any natural
stream or watercourse in this State is and shall be limited to such water as shall be reasonably
required for the beneficial use to be served . . . .”).
20. See California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 652–53 & n.7 (1978).
21. See CAL. WATER CODE § 179 (West 2006) (“The board succeeds to and is vested
with all of the powers, duties, purposes, responsibilities, and jurisdiction vested in . . . this
code, or any other law under which permits or licenses to appropriate water are issued,
denied, or revoked . . . .”).
22. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 314 (2001).
CVP service areas include Sacramento Valley. Sacramento Valley Central Valley Project
Water Service Contracts, N. CAL. WATER ASS’N, http://www.norcalwater.org/waterrights/sacramento-valley-central-valley-project-water-service-contracts/ (last visited Oct. 10,
2011). Further, SWP service areas include northern California regions such as Alameda,
Butte, Plumas, Solano, Napa, and Santa Clara, as well as Yuba City and the Bay Area.
California
State
Water
Project
Water
Contractors,
DEP’T WATER RES.,
http://www.water.ca.gov/swp/contractor_intro.cfm (last visited Oct. 5, 2011).
23. See Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 314–15.
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the right to withdraw water based on the water permits granted to the
24
BOR and DWR by the SWRCB. The allotment allowed under these
county contracts will be impacted by the amount of water available in
25
any given year, based upon natural causes. While the BOR and DWR
are responsible for the operating costs of the water system
infrastructure, regardless of the amount of water granted to them each
year by the SWRCB, the contracts between DWR and its water
contractors “explicitly provide that the state will not be held liable for
26
shortages due to drought or other causes beyond its control.”
At times when the BOR has failed to deliver specified water rights
based on contracts promising CVP water to California water districts,
the districts have filed suit against the United States alleging breach of
27
contract claims and takings claims. The supply of water under these
CVP contracts has been diminished in some years due to drought and
the need to keep water at levels sufficient to support fish and wildlife,
28
meet water quality standards, and generate hydroelectric power.
29
However, in Stockton East Water District v. United States, the Federal
Circuit found that, even assuming the BOR had acted reasonably in
30
allocating water rights, the fact that it did not meet its contractual
obligation to supply specified quantities of water to the districts did not
relieve it of contractual liability unless it could show that “the shortages
31
were the result of causes beyond the control of the United States.”
Even if the government avoided liability as a matter of contract law, the
water districts were allowed to bring takings claims for those years in
32
which they did not receive sufficient water under the BOR contracts.
The price that water districts pay for water should reflect the
uncertainty of the resource from year to year, as well as the need to
support the infrastructure necessary to deliver the water that is available
for allocation. However, water districts should not have to pay for water
they do not receive. Courts should allow recovery under contract law

24.
25.
26.
27.
2009).
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Stockton E. Water Dist. v. United States, 583 F.3d 1344, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
Id. at 1363.
Id. at 1344.
Id. at 1365.
Id. at 1369 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
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for government breaches, but water districts and other water users
should not be allowed to make takings claims by asserting that water
usage promised in a contract constitutes a property right, subject to a
governmental taking. Water is a common resource belonging to the
people, and the government should not be required to pay just
compensation when it diminishes water deliveries based on changing
33
hydrology projections from year to year.
As water in the West has continued to be a source of conflict
between a growing population and competing needs, policy makers have
struggled to incorporate rising environmental concerns into the
allocation and management of this scarce resource. The Central Valley
34
Project Improvement Act of 1992 (CVPIA) demonstrated the federal
shift in water policy away from the original purposes of supplying
water—which were consumptive uses such as irrigation, domestic use,
and industrial processes, in addition to electric energy production and
35
navigation improvement —and instead to the CVPIA’s added purposes
of fish and wildlife mitigation, protection, and restoration. The CVPIA
altered the priority of the purposes by expressly listing these new
36
purposes ahead of providing power.
In addition to policy changes focusing on environmental protection,
the CVPIA encourages the use of economic principles to allocate water
37
rights. CVP contracts can now be renewed for only a twenty-five year
term instead of a forty-year term, and they may be renewed only after
38
an Environmental Impact Statement is completed. This Act impacts
the amount of water that is made available to the BOR for the
operation of the CVP because it requires the BOR to annually dedicate
800,000 acre-feet of the CVP yield for fish, wildlife, and habitat
33. See CMIP3, BIAS CORRECTED AND DOWNSCALED WCRP CMIP3 CLIMATE AND
HYDROLOGY PROJECTIONS, http://gdo-dcp.ucllnl.org/downscaled_cmip3_projections/dcpIn
terface.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2011) (archive of past years changing hydrology
projections). Though there is currently no case that has alleged a taking based on hydrology,
it is nonetheless an important concept that the government should not be held liable because
of the fluctuating hydrology predictions.
34. Central Valley Project Improvement Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 3402, 106
Stat. 4706, 4706.
35. Stockton E. Water Dist., 583 F.3d at 1356.
36. Id. at 1356 (citing Central Valley Project Improvement Act § 3402).
37. Carl Boronkay & Timothy Quinn, The Central Valley Project Improvement Act: An
Urban Perspective, 3 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 57, 57–58 (1993) (“The Act . . .
introduce[d] basic economic reforms to narrow the gap between the cost to the taxpayer of
supplying CVP water and the prices paid for the water by CVP water users.”).
38. Id. at 58.
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39

restoration.
The limitations provided in the CVPIA have led to
conflicts that are best exemplified by the Stockton East Water District
40
decision.
Finally, the CVPIA promotes the voluntary marketing of CVP water
41
in California by allowing water transfers for beneficial uses.
Depending upon the circumstances and details of the transaction, these
transfers may require approval by the SWRCB in order to address
policy concerns such as unreasonable geographic concentration of
42
market activity and unacceptable third-party impacts. While water
marketing may help allocate water to its highest use based upon
43
pricing, transfers may not occur at an economically optimal level
44
It is also not clear
because of legal restrictions on such activity.
whether water rights are sufficiently certain to support an effective
market scheme.
Assuming water markets can operate successfully, there is still
concern that the market—and not policy makers—will allocate this
45
public resource. This concern is illustrated by the situation in Kings
39. Robert Jerome Glennon & John E. Thorson, Federal Environmental Restoration
Initiatives: An Analysis of Agency Performance and the Capacity for Change, 42 ARIZ. L.
REV. 483, 515–16 (2000).
40. See Stockton E. Water Dist. v. United States, 583 F.3d 1344, 1365–68 (Fed. Cir.
2009). In Stockton, the Government argued that the 1983 BOR contracts with water districts,
which specified minimum and maximum water deliveries, rendered performance impossible
because of the implementation of the 1992 CVPIA and the need to dedicate water to
environmental uses. Id. at 1366–67. The court held that the government had not met its
burden to show that the implementation of the CVPIA made performance impossible. Id. at
1360, 1367–68.
41. Boronkay & Quinn, supra note 37, at 61 (quoting Central Valley Project
Improvement Act § 3405(a)).
42. Id. at 61–62.
43. See Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Transferring Water Uses in the West, 43 OKLA. L. REV.
119, 119 (1990) (noting that water transfers are economically attractive because of the
“marked disparity in the value of water in many existing uses compared with water’s value in
alternative uses”).
44. Id. at 120. See generally Craig Anthony Arnold, Water Privatization Trends in the
United States: Human Rights, National Security, and Public Stewardship, 33 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 785, 786–89 (2009) (discussing how states’ statutes regulating water
rights negatively impacted water transfers in those states); Priyanka Sundareshan, Using the
Transfer of Water Rights as a Climate Change Adaptation Strategy: Comparing the United
States and Australia, 27 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 911, 930–35 (2010) (arguing that legal
barriers such as the “artificial legal distinction” between surface water rights and rights to
groundwater create inefficient outcomes when transferring water rights).
45. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1810 (West 2006); MacDonnell, supra note 43, at 127–28
(noting concerns about treating water as a commodity since it is a public resource and the
community should control water use rather than individual users).
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County, where farmers were selling their water to a large developer who
46
planned to build 23,000 homes in southern California.
Because
California now requires developers to show they have a sufficient water
47
source before building, farmers will sell their annual allotment of water
to the developers to ensure their ability to meet California’s allotment
requirement. Due to the fact that new housing is more valuable than
the water itself, farmers are then able to receive a price ten times the
48
water’s value. Such sales were prompted by cutbacks in State Water
Project deliveries from the Delta, forcing farmers to purchase
replacement water on the market at prices that increased their irrigation
49
costs and created an unacceptable business risk. As a result, there may
be a loss of agricultural production, which could potentially devastate
the economy in some California communities that rely on agriculture for
50
jobs, taxes, and general economic health.
Balancing the allocation of water, particularly in times of scarcity,
has continued to pit urban users, farmers, and fishers against each
51
other. The major problem is that while there is sufficient water in
northern California, the central and southern parts of the state need to
transfer water from the Sacramento–San Joaquin River Delta to supply
52
farmers in the Central Valley and urban users in southern California.
The storage and transfer of water from the north is accomplished by

46. Mark Grossi, Kings County Farmers Land Lucrative Water Sales, REVIVE THE SAN
JOAQUIN (Nov. 21, 2010), http://www.revivethesanjoaquin.org/content/kings-county-farmersland-lucrative-water-sales.
47. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 66473.7(b)(1) (West 2009); CAL. WATER CODE
§§ 10910, 10912 (West 1992); see also Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v.
City of Rancho Cordova, 150 P.3d 709, 718 (Cal. 2007) (discussing the level of certainty
regarding the sufficiency of water supply required for a new development).
48. Grossi, supra note 46.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Jody Only, Delta Debate Decision for Water Rights Farmers vs. Fishermen: Federal
Judge Orders Tracy Pumps On, EXAMINER.COM (May 26, 2010), http://www.examiner.
com/fishing-in-stockton/delta-debate-decision-for-water-rights-farmers-vs-fishermen-federaljudge-orders-tracy-pumps-on. It is not necessarily clear, though, why some agricultural users
are transferring their water supply. As suggested above, it may be because frequent supply
cutbacks render farming less feasible, or that the amount of money urban areas can pay for
the water far exceeds the net income that the farmers make through agriculture. In either
case, the result—a strong desire to transfer water—nevertheless has the potential to devastate
communities.
52. CONG. BUDGET OFF., U.S. CONG., WATER USE CONFLICTS IN THE WEST:
IMPLICATIONS OF REFORMING THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION’S WATER SUPPLY
POLICIES 27 (1997).
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managing a system of dams, canals, tunnels, and power plants which
must be paid for by the water users, regardless of how much water is
53
delivered from the state and federal water projects. The powerful
water pumps that deliver this Delta water from the Sacramento, San
Joaquin, and American rivers in the north to the Bay Area, the central
coast, and approximately two-thirds of southern California, trap and
interfere with salmon, steelhead, and sturgeon populations and impact
54
the southern-resident whales that feed on the salmon.
Beginning in 2005, the interests of the urban user, the farmer, and
the fish collided in newsworthy litigation when a group of sport-fishing
and environmental organizations challenged a finding by the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) that the Delta smelt was not
jeopardized by the impacts of the Delta’s federal and state water
55
diversion programs. The court in Natural Resources Defense Council v.
Kempthorne held that the biological opinion prepared by the FWS was
56
inadequate, in part because the opinion did not take into account the
57
issue of climate change. The judge deciding the Kempthorne case,
Judge Oliver Wanger, also held in a related case, Pacific Coast
58
Federation of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Gutierrez, that the biological
opinion prepared by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) in
59
Among other
2004 for various salmonid species was flawed.
inadequacies, both biological opinions failed to take into account the
effects of global climate change on the Delta’s hydrology when
determining whether the Delta water projects jeopardized these
threatened and endangered species and their habitats under the
60
Endangered Species Act.
By the end of 2007, Judge Wanger began issuing orders restricting
the operations for the Delta pumps and reducing and halting water
61
exports in order to protect the affected fish species. These restrictions
53. Grossi, supra note 46.
54. See Only, supra note 51.
55. Carolyn Brickey et al., How to Take Climate Change Into Account: A Guidance
Document for Judges Adjudicating Water Disputes, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 11215, 11217 (2010).
56. 506 F. Supp. 2d 322, 387–88 (E.D. Cal. 2007).
57. Id.
58. 606 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (E.D. Cal. 2008).
59. Id. at 1193; see also Brickey et al., supra note 55, at 11217 (discussing same and
comparing Gutierrez to Kempthorne).
60. Gutierrez, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 1183–84.
61. Interim Remedial Order Following Summary Judgment and Evidentiary Hearing at
2–3, Natural Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2007)
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caused an uproar. Water shortages and economic woes generated cries
for “people above fish” after the drought, which had resulted in fallow
62
farmland, unemployment, and economic decline in the Central Valley.
However, in May 2010, Judge Wanger reviewed the revised biological
opinion for salmonid and found that water officials acted arbitrarily and
capriciously, and that “consulting and action agencies . . . must take the
hard look under [the National Environmental Policy Act] at the
draconian consequences visited upon [the p]laintiffs, the water supply of
California, the agricultural industry, and the residents and communities
63
devastated by the water supply limitations imposed . . . .”
Judge
Wanger similarly found that the Delta smelt biological opinion was
arbitrary and capricious and failed to take into account the impact on
humans when considering water cutbacks to urban and agricultural
64
users.
Final judgment on the remaining Delta smelt claims was issued on
March 29, 2011, and the court ordered the FWS to complete a new
65
Delta smelt biological opinion by October 1, 2011. In May 2011, Judge
Wanger agreed to amend the judgment to adjust the remand schedule
such that a final biological opinion and other required analyses be
completed by December 1, 2013, instead of the initial October 1, 2011
66
deadline.
Now that California’s most recent three-year drought has finally
67
ended, the current controversy may also be coming to an end. Indeed,
the federal government and water contractors agreed, in February 2011,
to relax restrictions on pumping operations until the end of June 2011,
while federal agencies continue to monitor Delta conditions to
68
determine whether pumping must be limited.
The Delta litigation illustrates the dynamic nature of water
(No. 1:05-cv-01207).
62. 155 CONG. REC. H5099, 5103–04 (daily ed. May 5, 2009) (remarks of Rep. Calvert).
63. Consol. Salmonid Cases, 713 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1171 (E.D. Cal. 2010).
64. Consol. Delta Smelt Cases, 717 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1069–71 (E.D. Cal. 2010).
65. Delta Smelt Consol. Cases, No. 1:09-CV-00407, 2011 WL 1740308, at *1 (E.D. Cal.
May 4, 2011).
66. Id. at *8.
67. See Zeke Barlow, California’s Drought is Officially Over, VENTURA CNTY. STAR
(Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.vcstar.com/news/2011/mar/30/californias-drought-is-officiallyover/.
68. See Bettina Boxall, Temporary Truce Reached in California Delta Smelt Water
Restrictions, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/25/local/la-mesmelt-20110225.
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allocation in an environment faced with many challenges, including
changing climate, drought conditions, increasing demand for water
resources, and uncertainty regarding the impact of water limitations on
fish, habitats, crops, power generation, and humans. While assigning
private property rights has the potential to prevent a tragedy of the
commons and to promote the efficient use of a limited resource, it is
difficult in this dynamic system to provide certainty of the extent and
consistency of such rights. In addition, any establishment of a market in
natural resources will require an initial allocation of rights. This
allocation may be based on previous usage and priorities established as
part of our water law regimes, but such an arrangement may not be fair
because “[t]hose who are initially able to obtain the largest water rights
69
reap the benefits of future trades to more beneficial uses.”
Identifying water usage rights as property is problematic because the
rights initially belong to the state, and the state should be able to restrict
water usage without being required to pay a permit holder for the right
to retain the water instream. Finally, the public nature of this resource
is such that policy makers, rather than the private marketplace, should
determine the appropriate allocation of water on a continuing basis in
order to properly support agricultural economies and designate land use
for growing populations with water needs.
III. ALLOCATING FISH IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST
The nation’s fishery resources are managed under the auspices of the
Magnuson–Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act
(Magnuson–Stevens Act), which was enacted in 1975 “to protect United
States fisheries by extending the exclusive fisheries zone of the United
States from 12 to 200 miles and to provide for management of fishing
70
within the 200-mile zone.”
Under the Magnuson–Stevens Act,
Regional Fishery Management Councils (RFMCs) are required to
“prepare[] and submit[] to the Secretary of Commerce a fishery
management plan (FMP) with respect to each fishery within its

69. See Nicole L. Johnson, Property Without Possession, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 205, 229–
30 (2007) (noting that an “arbitrary initial allocation” of water can lead to inefficiencies over
time and creates distributive justice concerns).
70. Wash. State Charterboat Ass’n v. Baldrige, 702 F.2d 820, 823–24 (9th Cir. 1983)
(citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-445, at 21 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 593, at 593–94).
However, it could be argued that the controversy only temporarily took a rest due to a wet
year, and that new litigation will take place once new biological opinions are issued.
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71

geographical area of authority.” Fish allocation based on these FMPs
is subject to regulation under the Magnuson–Stevens Act, but must also
take into account other applicable law, including Indian treaty fishing
72
rights.
The United States Secretary of Commerce (Secretary), in
conjunction with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), manages
73
fishery resources subject to the Magnuson–Stevens Act.
For the
Pacific Northwest region, the Magnuson–Stevens Act empowers the
Pacific Coast Fishery Management Council (PFMC), as one of the
RFMCs, to make recommendations to the Secretary for FMPs covering
74
fisheries along the United States’ western territorial waters.
The Magnuson–Stevens Act requires that FMPs contain
conservation and management measures, which are consistent with ten
national standards as stated in 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1)–(10):
(1) Conservation and management measures shall prevent
overfishing while achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum
75
yield from each fishery for the United States fishing industry.
(2) Conservation and management measures shall be
based upon the best scientific information available.
(3) To the extent practicable, an individual stock of fish
shall be managed as a unit throughout its range, and interrelated
stocks of fish shall be managed as a unit or in close coordination.
(4) Conservation and management measures shall not
discriminate between residents of different States. If it becomes
necessary to allocate or assign fishing privileges among various
United States fishermen, such allocation shall be (A) fair and
equitable to all such fishermen; (B) reasonably calculated to
promote conservation; and (C) carried out in such manner that
no particular individual, corporation, or other entity acquires an
excessive share of such privileges.
(5) Conservation and management measures shall, where

71. Midwater Trawlers Coop. v. Dep’t of Commerce, 393 F.3d 994, 998 n.6 (9th Cir.
2004) (citations omitted) (quoting Washington v. Daley, 173 F.3d 1158, 1162 (9th Cir. 1999)).
72. Midwater Trawlers, 393 F.3d at 998.
73. United States v. Washington, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1220 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
74. Id.
75. Optimum yield is defined, in part, as the amount of fish which “will provide the
greatest overall benefit to the Nation, particularly with respect to food production and
recreational opportunities, and taking into account the protection of marine ecosystems . . . .”
16 U.S.C. § 1802(28)(A) (2006).
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practicable, consider efficiency in the utilization of fishery
resources; except that no such measure shall have economic
allocation as its sole purpose.
(6) Conservation and management measures shall take
into account and allow for variations among, and contingencies
in, fisheries, fishery resources, and catches.
(7) Conservation and management measures shall, where
practicable, minimize costs and avoid unnecessary duplication.
(8) Conservation and management measures shall,
consistent with the conservation requirements of this chapter
(including the prevention of overfishing and rebuilding of
overfished stocks), take into account the importance of fishery
resources to fishing communities by utilizing economic and
social data that meet the requirements of paragraph (2), in order
to (A) provide for the sustained participation of such
communities, and (B) to the extent practicable, minimize
adverse economic impacts on such communities.
(9) Conservation and management measures shall, to the
extent practicable, (A) minimize bycatch and (B) to the extent
bycatch cannot be avoided, minimize the mortality of such
bycatch.
(10) Conservation and management measures shall, to the
76
extent practicable, promote the safety of human life at sea.
In addition to the above-required national standards, “[t]he Magnuson–
Stevens Act provides discretionary authority for the NMFS . . . to
‘establish a limited access system for the fishery in order to achieve
optimum yield,’” by taking into account considerations such as
(A) present participation in the fishery;
(B) historical fishing practices in, and dependence on, the
fishery;
(C) the economics of the fishery;
(D) the capability of fishing vessels used in the fishery to
engage in other fisheries;
(E) the cultural and social framework relevant to the
fishery and any affected fishing communities;
(F) the fair and equitable distribution of access privileges
in the fishery; and

76. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1)–(10) (2006).
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77

The United States Pacific Northwest region provides a good
illustration of how state and federal fishing rights are allocated by
federal and state authorities among competing uses in both interior
water bodies and the ocean. Environmental, economic, and tribal
interests must be weighed in analyzing the right to capture these
important resources and must be distributed based upon year-to-year
78
projections of fish availability.
For example, as noted above in
Standard Two, the Magnuson–Stevens Act requires that fish allocation
be based on the “best scientific information available” for purposes of
79
conservation and management of fisheries.
The federal government maintains jurisdiction over fishery
resources, but under the Magnuson–Stevens Act, states retain
80
jurisdiction over resources within state territories. A state also has
jurisdiction over fishing vessels registered under the law of that state
when operating outside state territories, so long as such vessels are not
81
subject to federal fishing regulations. In any case, the state’s laws must
82
be consistent with the FMP or applicable federal fishing regulations.
Individual states cannot enforce regulations against vessels registered
under the law of other states when those vessels are operating in the
federal exclusive economic zone (EEZ) adjacent to state territorial
waters and submerged land that extends three miles from the state
83
coastline.
The prohibition against regulating other states’ vessels can be
modified by legislation when necessary to promote management of
77. Gen. Category Scallop Fishermen v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 720 F. Supp.
2d 564, 575 (D.N.J. 2010) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1853(b)(6) (2006)).
78. See, e.g., Midwater Trawlers Coop. v. Dep’t of Commerce, 393 F.3d 994, 1003 (9th
Cir. 2004) (discussing the Act’s requirement that “allocations between treaty and nontreaty
fishers be based on the ‘best scientific information available’” (citing and quoting 16 U.S.C §
1851(a)(2))); Midwater Trawlers Coop. v. Dep’t of Commerce, 282 F.3d 710, 719 (9th Cir.
2002) (“[T]he Makah Tribe is entitled, pursuant to the Treaty of Neah Bay, to one-half the
harvestable surplus of Pacific whiting that passes through its usual and accustomed fishing
grounds, or that much of the harvestable surplus as is necessary for tribal subsistence,
whichever is less.”).
79. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(2).
80. Marble v. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, 234 P.3d 1062, 1069 (Or. Ct. App. 2010) (citing
16 U.S.C. § 1856 (2006)).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1063 n.2, 1070.
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limited regional resources, as was done in the Dungeness Crab Act in
1996. The Dungeness Crab Act authorized Oregon, Washington, and
California “to enforce certain [s]tate regulations against all vessels
operating in the exclusive economic zone and fishing for Dungeness
84
crab,” so long as the state did not discriminate “against a vessel that
presently ‘is operating’ in its adjacent EEZ under the authority of an
85
out-of-state permit.” As a result, the court in Marble v. Department of
86
Fish and Wildlife held that Oregon did not discriminate against a vessel
presently holding an Oregon crab permit when Oregon considered past
crab landings to determine the allocation of crab-pot limits by the vessel,
but did not include landings for vessels registered under another state
87
during the qualifying period for the allocation determination.
Allocation decisions may be challenged under federal regulations
and various treaties. In Midwater Trawlers Co-Operative v. Department
of Commerce, the Ninth Circuit reviewed a challenged allocation of
88
Pacific whiting fish between treaty and non-treaty fishers.
The
challenged allocation was based on a sliding scale method instead of a
89
biomass method. The court concluded that even though the Fisheries
Service’s use of the sliding scale method may have been initially based
on a political compromise with the Makah Tribe, this method was
supported by the best available scientific information because it
accounted for the fish’s migratory pattern—something not accomplished
90
using the biomass method. The allocation was required because the
“Makah possesses an undisturbed right to take fish at its usual and
accustomed fishing grounds pursuant to the Stevens Treaties, which
have been interpreted to reserve for Indian tribes the right to up to half
of the harvestable surplus whiting, while reserving the other half for
91
non-treaty fishers . . . .”
84. Id. at 1070 (citing Pub. L. No. 104-297, § 112(d) (1996), repealed by Pub. L. No. 105674, § 2 (g) (1998)).
85. Id. at 1072.
86. Id. at 1064.
87. Id. at 1064, 1072.
88. 393 F.3d 994, 997–1002 (9th Cir. 2004).
89. Id. at 1003.
90. Id. at 1003–04 (noting that the biomass approach underestimated the number of fish
passing through the tribe’s fishing grounds).
91. See United States v. Washington, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1220–21 (W.D. Wash. 2001)
(“[H]arvestable surplus of whiting is defined as the total number of fish that may be taken
while observing all conservation needs that prevent demonstrable harm to the stock, and
treaty harvest is limited only by this conservation principle.”).

SAXER-13.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

11/21/2011 9:55 AM

MANAGING WATER RIGHTS

107

States in the Pacific Northwest are also responsible for managing
fisheries and fishing vessels within their jurisdictions. Over the years,
the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife (WDFW) developed
rules for salmon fishing in the Puget Sound. These rules were created
by forecasting the number of salmon expected to return for the season,
allocating the forecasted number between treaty and non-treaty
fishermen, and then holding public meetings to obtain agreement
92
between the gear groups of gillnetters and purse seiners. In 2008, when
the WDFW was unable to obtain agreement between gillnetters and
purse seiners, it adopted a rule allocating fishing opportunity based on
the number of fishing days, rather than capping the total catch for each
93
94
group. A trial court held this rule to be arbitrary and capricious.
The court in Puget Sound Harvesters Ass’n v. Washington State
95
Department of Fish & Wildlife upheld the trial court’s invalidation of
this rule as arbitrary and capricious because it did not take into account
“both time on the water and gear efficiency to estimate relative shares
of the fish harvest,” even though it had historical catch rates from
96
previous seasons, which reflected higher catch rates for gillnet gear.
The court observed that the development of these rules should reflect
the defined management objectives for the fisheries:
(1) Ensure the conservation of target species—meet
spawning goals;
(2) Minimize catch or impacts on incidental species
(bycatch);
(3) Monitor and sample all fisheries;
(4) Maintain the economic well-being and stability of the
fishing industry;
(5) Fully utilize the non-Indian allowable catch; and,
(6) Fairly allocate harvest opportunity between gear
97
groups.
Thus, both federal and state laws utilize allocation rules to ensure
92. Puget Sound Harvesters Ass’n v. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, 239 P.3d 1140, 1141–42
(Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
93. Id. at 1142.
94. Id. at 1144.
95. Id. at 1140.
96. Id. at 1147–48.
97. Id. at 1146 (discussing objectives for Puget Sound commercial salmon fisheries).
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conservation of fish species for the benefit of the fishing industry and
other interest groups. International laws are beyond the scope of this
Article, although fish and water resources are certainly impacted by the
actions of other nations and their citizens. The state and federal
allocation of fishing rights does not require that these rights be
recognized as property rights. As discussed in Part IV, infra, fishing
rights are not considered property in challenges to government
regulation based on the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Similarly, water rights should not be considered property subject to a
takings challenge and should, instead, be treated as revocable licenses.
IV. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN UNCAPTURED FISH AND WATER
A. Ecosystem Challenges
The allocation systems for water and fish must deal with the
ecosystem challenges associated with fragile and interconnected
resources. Both water and fish allocation systems have been criticized
98
for their failure to take into account ecosystem management. Instead
of taking on the ecosystem as a whole, fishing regulations have focused
99
on specific species, whereas prior appropriation and riparian rights
98. See, e.g., Donna R. Christie, Living Marine Resources Management: A Proposal for
Integration of United States Management Regimes, 34 ENVTL. L. 107, 114, 153 (2004) (noting
the 1996 reauthorization of the Magnuson–Stevens Act, its major changes, and the remaining
criticisms); Sarah M. Kutil, Comment, Scientific Certainty Thresholds in Fisheries
Management: A Response to a Changing Climate, 41 ENVTL. L. 233, 239 (2011) (noting that
even though the Magnuson–Stevens Act was amended in 2006 to increase its focus on
conservation, the Act is flawed because it does not “provide a framework for or require a
scientific certainty threshold . . . to manage fisheries”); cf. Brickey et al., supra note 55, at
11221, 11226–27 (discussing water management concerns, including the conjunctive
management of surface and groundwater, the negative externalities from conservation, the
need for integrated land use planning with water supply availability, and the need for a
flexible water rights approach to manage large fluctuations in water supply). However, unlike
fish populations, which are organic resources subject to extinction if their levels drop too low,
fresh water is not in danger of extinction (though it may potentially cause extinction of
organic resources if it is in short supply and unable to support aquatic ecosystems).
99. Turnipseed et al., supra note 13, at 6 (observing that “unsustainable fishing practices
have been responsible for some of the most harmful effects on ocean ecosystems” and
explaining that management by species can result in a high discard rate with three fish thrown
back for every ten fish captured); see also Christie, supra note 98, at 135 (explaining that
fisheries management in the United States historically focused on a single species and that
“this species-by-species approach has contributed to a seeming ‘domino effect’ in the collapse
of fisheries”); Robin Kundis Craig, Protecting International Marine Biodiversity: International
Treaties and National Systems of Marine Protected Areas, 20 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 333,
359 (2005) (“[O]ne of the most important limitations of regulation directed specifically at
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have focused on water resources in specific water bodies.
Yet, it is
only through an emphasis on ecosystem management that we can
101
effectively protect and manage our fish and water resources.
In addition, by applying the public trust doctrine to federal ocean
management, the government will be required to protect ecosystems as
it acts as a trustee to protect the public uses of these valuable trust
102
resources.
Economic-based market systems may be used to protect
ecosystems from overexploitation by commodities users such as
commercial fisherman and water consumers, but only if these
ecosystems can be valued for the additional amenities they provide, such
103
as recreation and tourism.
Like fish, the available water supply is dependent upon natural
conditions, which may vary drastically from season to season and year to
year and are currently out of direct human control. Both of these
resources are intricately connected to fragile ecosystems, which can be
permanently damaged by overexploitation. As common resources, both
water and fish are subject to a tragedy of the commons scenario, which
104
may be partially resolved by private ownership.
Our current model for fishing management has its limitations, but
the underlying theories of natural resource economics are applicable to
our water management challenges. The United States has attempted to
control overfishing and overinvestment in the fishing industry by having
government agencies set annual allocations (quotas) based upon

fishing is that such regulation tends to focus exclusively on the targeted species, without
consideration of the larger ecosystem on which it depends.”).
100. See Dellapenna, supra note 3, at 55, 64–65.
101. Christie, supra note 98, at 168 (“Both exploited and protected species should be
managed through a comprehensive system that takes an ecosystem-based approach to
decisions concerning the level of removal allowed for species.”); Craig, supra note 99, at 369
(“Only an international law regime that addresses all of those threats [to marine
biodiversity]—pollution, overfishing and its associated problems, loss of habitat, and invasive
species—both individually and collectively can effectively halt, and hopefully reverse, the
increasing trend of marine species extinctions and loss of marine biodiversity at all levels.”);
see also THE WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE INTERAGENCY OCEAN POLICY TASK FORCE 14 (2010) (describing how it is time for the
Nation to focus on ecosystem management to effectively use and protect environmental
resources).
102. Turnipseed et al., supra note 13, at 68.
103. Robin Kundis Craig, Valuing Coastal and Ocean Ecosystem Services: The Paradox
of Scarcity for Marine Resources Commodities and the Potential Role of Lifestyle Value
Competition, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 355, 362–63 (2007).
104. See Eagle, supra note 9, at 623.
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105

scientific advice regarding available catch levels.
This model of sole
government ownership is an economic approach based on the theory
that such ownership “rationalizes resource use by eliminating wasteful
competition for the resource among fishermen and by internalizing
106
individually generated externalities.” However, as a “private” owner,
the government must regulate to limit resource usage, and also facilitate
107
the investment by fishermen to extract the resource.
Some systems of allocating water rights and fishing rights have been
based upon prior usage. Such a prior use requirement for allocation of
rights may create an incentive to “race to capture” either water or fish
to establish a historical usage basis by which future allocations will be
108
determined. For fish, the allocation of individual fishing quotas (IFQ)
109
is used to limit the taking of fish to preserve fish stocks. Because these
110
quotas are typically issued based upon a prior fishing history,
regulators may attempt to avoid a race to capture by limiting the
qualifying period to preceding years well in advance of the regulation
implementation. This approach helps diminish “the incentive [for
fishermen] to pour money and time into the fishery in order to get a
111
bigger quota share . . . .”
For water, similar race to capture concerns exist, particularly in
those states using prior appropriation to determine water rights. In a
particularly famous illustration of this problem, William Mulholland

105. Id. at 644–46 (discussing the Magnuson–Stevens Act and the efforts of the Gulf of
Mexico Fishery Management Council).
106. Id. at 643 (noting, however, that there is a distinction between public and private
ownership in that the government is not profit oriented like a private owner is).
107. See id. at 623–24.
108. Jonathan Remy Nash, Allocation and Uncertainty: Strategic Responses to
Environmental Grandfathering, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 809, 811 (2009). As Remy explains,
To prevent the creation of an incentive for actors to increase their current
activities in order to receive a larger allocation of resource access in the future, the
government may choose to base allocations not on current activities, but on recent
activities that predate the announced intention to implement limitations on
resource access.
Id.
109. Id. at 819.
110. See, e.g., Van Valin v. Locke, 671 F. Supp. 2d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2009) (“While present
participation in the fishery is one factor that the Secretary must examine when considering
fishery management measures, another factor is historic harvest participation levels.”).
111. Nash, supra note 108, at 826 (quoting Alliance Against IFQS v. Brown, 84 F.3d 343,
348 (9th Cir. 1996)).
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appropriated the Owens Valley water for Los Angeles. In 1906, Senator
Frank Flint of California introduced a bill to obtain rights-of-way across
federal land for Los Angeles to proceed with the water transport from
112
the Owens Valley.
Although the bill easily won Senate approval,
Congressman Sylvester Smith, a member of the House Public Lands
Committee, stalled the bill and proposed that the project could move
forward so long as “the Owens Valley would have a nonnegotiable first
right to the water, and any surplus water could not be used for irrigation
113
in the San Fernando Valley.” Senator Flint then made an impassioned
appeal to President Roosevelt:
Smith’s prohibition on using surplus water in the San Fernando
Valley left the city no choice but to leave any surplus in the
Owens Valley or dump it in the ocean. In the first case, water
rights the city had purchased at great expense might revert to
the valley under the doctrine of appropriative rights; in the
second case, the city would violate the California constitution,
114
which forbade “inefficient use” of water.
Roosevelt agreed with Flint and wrote, “‘[T]his water is more
115
valuable to the people of Los Angeles than to the Owens Valley.’”
Los Angeles proceeded with Mulholland’s plan to store unused water in
a natural underground storage reservoir in the San Fernando Valley and
116
turn the Valley’s arid land into valuable agricultural plots.
Mulholland’s plan to divert as much water as possible for Los Angeles
was designed to avoid “the use-it-or-lose-it principle in the doctrine of
117
appropriative rights.”
Fishing allocations under a FMP are valuable rights, but they have
118
not traditionally been viewed as property rights belonging to fishers.
Instead, property rights in this resource arose only when the fish were

112. MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS
DISAPPEARING WATER 79 (1993).
113. Id. at 79–80.
114. Id. at 81–82.
115. Id. at 82.
116. Id. at 73–74.
117. Id. at 73. What is also interesting is that the key public trust case in California,
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), resulted
from Mulholland’s effort to bring water from the Eastern Sierra to Southern California.
118. Nash, supra note 108, at 819.
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captured within the limits of fishing permits. The concept of the IFQ,
discussed above, created a category of “property rights in the form of
issuing licenses to fish for a specified quantity of the species in
120
question.” These rights were transferable by private sale and created
a private market, supported by the concept of limiting access to fishery
121
resources.
By restricting entry to the commons through the
establishment of property rights in the fish stocks, economists hoped to
122
solve the potential collapse of our fish resources.
However, the
Magnuson–Stevens Act limits these IFQ rights by notifying permit
holders that these licenses are revocable at any time without
compensation because the license “‘shall not create, or be construed to
create, any right, title, or interest in or to any fish before the fish is
123
Thus, the advantage of using private property rights to
harvested.’”
incentivize efficiency is “somewhat undercut by the temporary nature of
124
the created property interest.”
Nevertheless, “fishers usually do not
have property rights in wild fish before they are harvested from the
125
sea.”
In contrast, water rights have more frequently been viewed as
property rights protected not only by priority in relation to others based
on first-in-time, first-in-right ownership, but also against excessive
government restriction of these rights under Fifth Amendment Takings
126
law. Although water rights have been referred to as property rights,
such rights are “not to the water itself but to the priority to the use of
127
Thus, water rights may have value
water from a particular source.”

119. See id.
120. Harry N. Scheiber & Christopher J. Carr, From Extended Jurisdiction to
Privatization: International Law, Biology, and Economics in the Marine Fisheries Debates,
1937–1976, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 10, 16 (1998).
121. Id. at 16, 54.
122. Will Walsh, Comment, Fishy Business, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1661, 1662–63 (2008).
123. Id. at 1674 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1853(d)(3)(D) (2000)).
124. Id. at 1676; see also Katrina M. Wyman, The Property Rights Challenge in Marine
Fisheries, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 511, 514 (2008) (advocating a broader view of property rights in
fisheries to take into account both aquaculture and wild fisheries).
125. See Wyman, supra note 124, at 527.
126. Richard A. Epstein, Playing by Different Rules? Property Rights in Land and Water
3 (N.Y.U. L. & Econ. Res. Paper Ser., Working Paper No. 10-56, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1719688##.
127. MacDonnell, supra note 43, at 121. Thus, what is ultimately at issue is the right to
use. What complicates this matter even more are the cases that have dealt with contract
rights to water, rather than appropriative or riparian rights. See Kern Cnty. Water Agency v.
Belridge Water Storage Dist., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 354, 360 (Ct. App. 1993); Empire W. Side
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between private persons, but they should be subject to revocation by the
government acting for the public trust, without payment of just
128
compensation. Establishing certainty by recognizing property rights in
water may help improve market efficiency, but the water supply is as
uncertain as the yearly harvest opportunity for fish and these two
resources may not be amenable to privatization in the way that real
property has been successfully privatized to avoid a tragedy of the
129
commons.
B. The Takings Clause
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states the following:
“nor shall private property be taken for a public use without just
130
compensation.”
The United States Supreme Court in Armstrong v.
131
United States recognized that this guarantee “was designed to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
132
whole.”
If we have been receiving water and we get less than we
need—perhaps because the government has determined that the water
is needed for the fish—should the government pay us just compensation
because it has taken away a property right? If fish die or diminish in
number because there is not enough water to support them or our needs
have reduced their numbers, do the fishermen deserve just
compensation because the government has allowed their fishing rights
133
to dissipate due to overexploitation?

Irrigation Dist. v. Lovelace, 85 Cal. Rptr. 552, 555 (Ct. App. 1970). Then, to further cloud the
issues, there is also a line of cases that have ruled on the issue of taking groundwater rights.
See Orange Cnty. Water Dist. v. Arnold Eng’g Co., 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d 328, 339 (Ct. App.
2011); Starrh & Starrh Cotton Growers v. Aera Energy, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 165, 182–83 (Ct.
App. 2007) (analogizing that groundwater rights are akin to real property rights).
128. George J. Mannina Jr., Is There a Legal and Conservation Basis for Individual
Fishing Quotas?, 3 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 5, 49–50 (1997) (citing Acton v. United States,
401 F.2d 896, 899 (9th Cir. 1968)).
129. See Epstein, supra note 126, at 59–60.
130. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
131. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
132. Id. at 49.
133. The issue, then, is whether fishermen can state a takings cause of action if they can
show that water authorization reduced their take of fish. It might be difficult, because there is
generally no property right to wild animals until they are reduced to possession under the
right of capture. Patrick Stoklas, Comment, Popov v. Hayashi, A Modern Day Pierson v.
Post: A Comment on What the Court Should Have Done With the Seventy-Third Home Run
Baseball Hit by Barry Bonds, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 901, 910 (2003). In essence, the “right to
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When water rights are restricted in order to serve public needs, such
as with the protection of endangered species or habitat preservation,
such regulations have been subject to takings claims to prevent
134
individual farmers or other entities from bearing a public burden. In
contrast, courts in fishing cases have recognized that the Secretary of
Commerce is allowed to allocate fish even where “the interests of some
groups of fishermen [are sacrificed] for the benefit as the Secretary sees
135
it of the fishery as a whole.”
Both fishermen and farmers have
investments that are affected by reductions in supply. Fishermen have
invested in boats, nets, and other fishing gear, while farmers have
invested in farm equipment and farmland. However, the supplies of
both fish and water are dynamic and the government should be allowed
to allocate these natural resources for the public good without exposure
to takings claims.
The first requirement of a takings claim is the existence of a private
136
property right that is compensable under the Fifth Amendment.
While takings claims involving water rights have had mixed success
137
because of the uncertain nature of these rights as property, takings
claims involving fishing rights have been uniformly dismissed because
“[h]olders of fishing permits issued pursuant to the Magnuson–Stevens
138
Act do not possess a valid property interest in such permits.” Water
rights are similar to fishing rights and grazing rights and, as such, should
not be treated as property. Instead, these rights should be treated as
fish” is the right to have an opportunity to fish, but if no fish are caught, then there can be no
taking under traditional property principles.
134. See infra text accompanying notes 138–70. But see MacDonnell, supra note 43, at
123 (“In California, the public trust doctrine has been found to require a reconsideration of
the amount of water that may be used under an existing water right.”).
135. Fishermen’s Finest, Inc. v. Locke, 593 F.3d 886, 899 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Alliance Against IFQs v. Brown, 84 F.3d 343, 350 (9th Cir. 1996)); see also N.C. Fisheries
Ass’n v. Gutierrez, 518 F. Supp. 2d 62, 89 (D.D.C. 2007) (“[C]ourts have declined to secondguess the Secretary’s judgment simply because the provisions of a [Fishery Management Plan]
or a plan allocation ‘have a greater impact upon’ one group or type of fishermen.” (quoting
Nat’l Fisheries Inst., Inc. v. Mosbacher, 732 F. Supp. 210, 225 (D.D.C. 1990))).
136. See Sacramento Grazing Ass’n v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 175, 189 (2010) (citing
Sacramento Grazing Ass’n v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 211, 216–17 (2005)) (“[T]aking cannot
exist without an underlying compensable property right.”).
137. See Saxer, supra note 11, at 51–53; John D. Leshy, A Conversation About Takings
and Water Rights, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1985, 2006 (2005) (“[C]hronic uncertainty about the
validity and measure of many water rights has some important implications for takings law.”).
138. Gen. Category Scallop Fishermen v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 720 F. Supp.
2d 564, 576 (D.N.J. 2010) (citing Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363,
1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
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licenses that are revocable by the government without requiring just
139
compensation.
State and federal courts have varied views on whether property
140
Some courts have treated water rights as
rights in water exist.
141
property and conducted a takings analysis, while others have found
that no property rights in water exist and have dismissed the claim
142
because the first requirement for a takings challenge has not been met.
One court stressed the difference between land ownership rights and
usufructuary rights in water, but then continued in that same decision to
143
find a taking of water rights.
Early court decisions recognized property rights in water sufficient
144
In Dugan v. Rank, 145 for example, the United
for a takings claim.
States Supreme Court concluded that the United States government
committed a partial taking of water by operating a dam that would have
reduced the natural amount of water flowing in the San Joaquin River
146
Recent decisions have also recognized
by almost three-fourths.
147
property rights in water. In Hage v. United States (Hage IV), the
139. Recall that under California case law, water right permits are under the jurisdiction
of the SWRCB and are subject to modification for public interest and public trust purposes.
United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 185-87 (Ct. App. 1986). It
follows that post-1914 appropriative water right holders were on notice at the time they filed
their application that what they were obtaining was a license, and it was subject to
modification. See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text.
140. See supra Part II.
141. See, e.g., Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2002);
Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
142. See, e.g., Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 532 (2005)
(characterizing the claimant’s right as a contract right rather than a property right); Mono
Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 723 (Cal. 1983) (rejecting the notion that the public trust approach to
water constitutes a taking).
143. See Hage V, 82 Fed. Cl. 202, 211 (2008) (noting the difference between water
ownership as the right to access and use water versus land ownership as the right to exclude,
and then finding a taking based on the government fencing around the water and streams).
144. See, e.g., Rivers and Harbors Act § 2, Pub. L. No. 75-392, 50 Stat. 844, 850 (1937)
(“[T]he Secretary of the Interior . . . may acquire by proceedings in eminent domain, or
otherwise, all lands, rights-of-way, water rights, and other property necessary for said
purposes . . . .”); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 296–97 (1958)
(recognizing a property right but finding no taking); United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co.,
339 U.S. 725, 752–55 (1950) (finding the riparian owner held rights which could only be
acquired by the government through condemnation or acquisition); Int’l Paper Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 399, 405–07 (1931) (finding a taking of the plaintiff’s water rights).
145. 372 U.S. 609 (1963).
146. Id. at 623.
147. 51 Fed. Cl. 570 (2002).
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Court of Federal Claims acknowledged that “[t]he surface waters which
flow from federal land to Plaintiffs’ patented lands are a vested water
148
right,” although in Hage V the court distinguished between having title
149
to the water and owning the right to use the water. The Hage V court
noted that there is a “difference between water ownership and real
property ownership; water is a usufructuary as opposed to a possessory
150
Nevertheless, the court held that “the Government’s
right.”
construction of fences around the water and streams amounts to a
physical taking during the time period in which Plaintiffs’ still had a
grazing permit and their cattle had the right to water at these
151
Thus, while the court distinguished water rights from real
streams.”
property ownership based upon its usufruct nature, it still found a
152
private property right in water sufficient to support a takings claim.
The “contractually-conferred right to the use of water” was
identified as property subject to a taking in Tulare Lake Basin Water
153
The Tulare court recognized that
Storage District v. United States.
“under California law[,] the title to water always remains with the
154
state,” but concluded “that plaintiffs’ right to the use of water is a
155
The court determined that the
compensable contractual right . . . .”
“right to the use” of the water is a “physical taking” when the federal
government preserved water to protect fish under the Endangered
Species Act and “rendered the usufructuary right to that water
156
valueless.”
A few years later in Casitas Municipal Water District v. United
157
States, the Federal Circuit followed the Tulare decision to conclude
that the diversion of water for a fish ladder was a permanent physical
158
The Casitas decision did not directly
taking of water from Casitas.
address the issue of whether water rights are property rights because, for
148. See Hage V, 82 Fed. Cl. at 210 (citing Hage IV, 51 Fed. Cl. at 576–80).
149. Id. at 211.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 212.
153. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 314 (2001).
154. Id. at 318 (citing CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (Deering 1977)).
155. Id. at 318 n.6.
156. Id. at 319 (finding a “physical taking” and comparing this denial of a right to use
water to the invasion of air space above a landowner’s property that was found to be a taking
in United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265 (1946)).
157. 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
158. Id. at 1296 (“The water, and Casitas’ right to use that water, is forever gone.”).
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purposes of the summary judgment motion at issue in the case, the
government “conceded that Casitas has a valid property right in the
159
water in question.”
However, the dissent in Casitas observed that
“Casitas does not own the water in question because all water sources
160
within California belong to the public,” and, since California subjects
water rights permits to the public trust doctrine, there can be no takings
161
claim if there is no property interest in the water. The dissent further
opined that “because Casitas possesses a usufructuary interest in the
water and does not actually own the water molecules at issue, it is
difficult to imagine how its property interest in the water could be
162
physically invaded or occupied.”
State law regarding property rights in water is similarly divergent.
The Court of Federal Claims in Klamath Irrigation District v. United
163
States recognized no property rights in water, except as created based
164
upon contracts between the water users and the United States. Under
Oregon law, the water users in Klamath were not allowed to assert a
takings claim because they did not have a property right in the water
165
and, thus, were restricted only to contract remedies.
Nebraska law
166
also appears to restrict private ownership of water rights.
The
Nebraska Supreme Court in Spear T Ranch, Inc. v. Nebraska
Department of Natural Resources (Spear II) did not reach the question
of private ownership of water, but the court did hold that surface water
users who were adversely impacted by groundwater withdrawals could
167
Although the same court
not assert an inverse condemnation claim.
had stated in its earlier Spear I decision that “[a] right to appropriate
159. Id. at 1288.
160. Id. at 1297 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (citing CAL. WATER CODE §§ 102, 1001 (West
1992)).
161. Id. at 1297.
162. Id. at 1298.
163. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 540 (2005).
164. Id. at 523–24 (noting that according to Oregon state law, the United States
government held ownership title to the water).
165. Id. at 540 (concluding that landowners have potential contract claims only as
against the United States).
166. See Zellmer & Harder, supra note 5, at 736–37 (noting that the Spear T Ranch, Inc.
v. Knaub (Spear I), 691 N.W.2d 116, 127 (Neb. 2005), decision is problematic and that earlier
Nebraska courts had concluded that surface water appropriators “did in fact possess vested
property rights”).
167. 699 N.W.2d 379, 386 (Neb. 2005) (finding that the government agency “did not have
authority to regulate ground water users or administer ground water rights for the benefit of
surface water appropriators”).
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surface water however, is not an ownership of property” for purposes of
168
supporting a claim for conversion or trespass, it based its Spear II
takings claim denial on the government’s lack of a duty to act, rather
169
than on the lack of a property interest held by the plaintiff water user.
Although many state and federal decisions have found water to be a
compensable property interest, there remains great inconsistency as to
170
the nature of this right.
While water rights have readily been considered property rights by
some courts, grazing rights, granted by the federal government, are not
171
considered property rights compensable under the Fifth Amendment.
172
For example, in Alves v. United States, the Federal Circuit relied on
173
the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Fuller to find that
neither grazing permits nor grazing preferences constitute a
174
compensable property interest under the Fifth Amendment.
In
Sacramento Grazing Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, both grazing rights and
175
water rights were at issue. The Court of Federal Claims determined
176
that there is “no property right to forage,” but noted that “[u]nder
New Mexico law, the right to use water is a property right separate and
177
severable from a right to land” and entitles the water user to bring a
claim that the United States Forest Service has taken a vested right to
178
use range stock water. It is an interesting contrast that grazing rights
are not compensable property rights, whereas water rights needed to
179
raise the cattle are subject to a takings claim.

168. Spear I, 691 N.W.2d at 127.
169. Spear II, 699 N.W.2d at 385.
170. Zellmer & Harder, supra note 5, at 738 (“Outside of the navigational servitude
context, the federal courts have been wildly inconsistent regarding takings claims brought by
appropriators with state-sanctioned water rights.”); see also In re Hood River, 227 P. 1065,
1087 (Or. 1924) (“No one has any property in the water itself, but a simple usufruct.”).
171. Sacramento Grazing Ass’n v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 175, 189 (2010).
172. 133 F.3d 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
173. 409 U.S. 488, 494 (1973) (holding there are no compensable property rights in
grazing permits issued under the Taylor Grazing Act).
174. Alves, 133 F.3d at 1457.
175. Sacramento Grazing Ass’n, 96 Fed. Cl. at 188.
176. Id. at 189.
177. Id. at 191.
178. Id. at 190.
179. Id. at 192 (citing Templeton v. Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy Dist., 332 P.2d
465, 471 (N.M. 1958), a New Mexico case which held “that water rights holders are ‘entitled
to the waters . . . that flowed . . . at the time of their appropriation’”); see also Acton v. United
States, 401 F.2d 896, 899 (9th Cir. 1968) (“Grazing permits create no interest or estate in
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Rather than following the water law precedents, which generally
established a property right for purposes of the Takings Clause, the
fishing rights cases relied on the grazing decisions to hold that fishing
180
permits are not property protected by the Fifth Amendment. Citing
Fuller and Alves, the Federal Circuit in Conti v. United States found that
the swordfishing permit at issue in Conti was similar to the grazing
181
permits and thus did not constitute a property interest.
The court
declined to recognize “a property interest in the government’s
discretionary decision not to exercise its explicitly granted authority to
182
revoke, suspend, or modify the permit.”
The Federal Circuit later
extended the reasoning in Conti to the commercial fishing permits at
183
issue in American Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States.
The court
concluded “that American Pelagic did not and could not possess a
184
property interest in its fishery permits” because, without the right to
assign, sell, or transfer these permits, they held only a revocable license,
185
not a property right.
Fishing rights were also compared to grazing rights in Palmyra
186
Pacific Seafoods, L.L.C. v. United States and Organized Fishermen of
187
Florida v. Watt, to find that no compensable property interest exists
for these revocable licenses and permits. In Palmyra, the Federal
Circuit affirmed that in order to have a cause of action for a Fifth
Amendment Taking, there must be a protectable property interest and a
ban on fishing that results in a reduction of the value of a fishing license
188
does not affect any compensable property interest. The Palmyra court
discussed the Colvin Cattle case and used the Colvin holding that “the
government’s prohibition on grazing did not constitute a taking of the
public lands, only a privilege which may be withdrawn.”).
180. Vanek v. Alaska Bd. of Fisheries, 193 P.3d 283, 292 (Alaska 2008) (“Although we
have treated limited entry permits as property for other purposes such as inheritance and
child support, the federal cases are persuasive in their reasoning that fishing permits do not
confer property interests for the purposes of takings claims.”).
181. Conti v. United States, 291 F.3d 1334, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Applying traditional
notions of property and existing rules and understandings, we conclude that Mr. Conti’s
swordfishing permit, like the grazing permits in Fuller and Alves, falls short of conferring a
cognizable property interest.”).
182. Id. at 1342 n.5.
183. 379 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. 561 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
187. 590 F. Supp. 805, 815 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
188. Palmyra Pac. Seafoods, 561 F.3d at 1367.
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ranch owner’s property” to support its determination that “the
government’s prohibition on commercial fishing in the waters
surrounding Palmyra [did not take] their rights to run a commercial
189
fishing operation on the island.” The court in Organized Fishermen of
Florida v. Watt used grazing permit cases from the Ninth and Tenth
Circuit Courts of Appeal to conclude that just as a grazing permit may
be withdrawn by the government at any time without paying
compensation, a commercial fishing permit may be restricted or
cancelled without compensation because such permits are a privilege
190
and, by nature, revocable.
Courts continue to uniformly find that fishing rights are not property
191
interests compensable under the Fifth Amendment.
Relying on a
192
“wealth of federal precedent,” the court in Burns Harbor Fish Co. v.
Ralston concluded that although a license might be property in relation
193
194
to a third party and within the meaning of the Due Process Clause,
any necessary environmental restriction by Indiana is not a compensable
195
Taking, and is merely “a cost of doing business.” The Burns Harbor
court acknowledged that the State of Indiana was “the very entity that
authorized Burns Harbor’s licenses to fish in the first instance” and that
“the State which ‘giveth’ may take or limit a license in almost any
196
reasonable way.”
The court of Federal Claims in Arctic King Fisheries, Inc. v. United
States also pointed out that, in addition to the fact that fishing permits
189. Id. (discussing Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d 803 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
190. 590 F. Supp. at 815–16 (citing Pankey Land & Cattle Co. v. Hardin, 427 F.2d 43, 45
(10th Cir. 1970); and Osborne v. United States, 145 F.2d 892, 896 (9th Cir. 1944)).
191. See, e.g., Gen. Category Scallop Fishermen v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 720
F. Supp. 2d 564, 576 (D.N.J. 2010) (“Holders of fishing permits issued pursuant to the
Magnuson–Stevens Act do not possess a valid property interest in such permits.”); Gonzalez
v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 695 F. Supp. 2d 474, 504 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (finding that plaintiffs
did not “demonstrate a property interest with respect to the federal shrimping permits”);
Burns Harbor Fish Co. v. Ralston, 800 F. Supp. 722, 726–27 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (confirming that
fishing licenses are not property requiring protection under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment); Douglas F. Britton, The Privatization of the American Fishery: Limitations,
Recognitions, and the Public Trust, 3 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 217, 235 (1997) (“Historically
speaking, fishermen have not been successful in their pursuit of takings claims for the
compensation of restricted fishing rights or lost fisheries resources, mostly due to the
historical treatment of fish, and the doctrine of res communes.”).
192. Burns Harbor Fish Co., 800 F. Supp. at 727.
193. Id. at 722, 728.
194. Id. at 730.
195. Id. at 728–29.
196. Id. at 728.
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have not been recognized as possessing sufficient property
characteristics, there is a concern “that the government not be required
197
to pay compensation for value that it created.” Similarly, water users
originally granted the usufructuary right to water by the government
should not be compensated for a taking when the government reduces
or eliminates access to this public resource in order to protect its
198
continuing value to all.
Even when fishing rights are viewed in the context of individual
fishing quotas (IFQs) such that conferring a property interest would
199
establish a market in the permits, “[i]t is also settled law that a license
to perform an act upon public lands and waterways does not vest the
holder with a permanent property right which, if revoked, is subject to
200
compensation under the [T]akings [C]lause of the Fifth Amendment.”
The Magnuson–Stevens Act endorses this settled law and explicitly
provides “that an IFQ is a revocable permit which does not confer any
201
right to compensation if revoked or limited.”
Treating fishing rights as revocable licenses instead of property for
purposes of the Takings Clause is not without its problems. This settled
law may create a disincentive for fishermen to invest in equipment and
places the government in the dual position of being both a regulator for
conservation purposes and a facilitator of those who will capture and
202
sell these natural resources.
Professor Josh Eagle argues that these
conflicting roles will compromise the effectiveness of fishing regulation
and, in combination with the fisherman’s incentive to fight conservation,
197. Arctic King Fisheries, Inc. v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 360, 371 (2004) (citing
United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 493 (1973)).
198. See Leshy, supra note 137, at 2022–23 (observing that “the nation’s taxpayers have
been bestowing gifts on farmers for decades” and it would be anomalous to require the
taxpayers to compensate the farmers when it decides to “end the gift-giving”); see also
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 563 (2001) (“Any
government redistribution of private property necessarily involves givings and takings, and
any government destruction of property can be matched with a government creation of
property.”).
199. See Britton, supra note 191, at 247–48 (discussing the property characteristics of
individual fishing quotas, but observing that they are only recognized as a privilege that can
be revoked).
200. See Mannina, supra note 128, at 49.
201. Id. at 50; see also John A. Duff, Offshore Management Considerations: Law and
Policy Questions Related to Fish, Oil, and Wind, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 385, 390–91
(2004) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(4) (2000) and noting that “the government protected itself
against a future claim that any restriction or abolition of the interest should be compensable
as a violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment”).
202. Eagle, supra note 9, at 624.
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the Magnuson–Stevens Act will not achieve its goal of sustainable
203
fisheries unless it is changed to account for these concerns.
Besides causing difficulty with investment security and
204
sustainability, the failure to recognize a fisherman’s property rights in
fishery resources has also limited tort damages for private individuals
suffering economic losses due to negligent damage to natural
205
resources.
The holding in the seminal maritime case of Robins Dry
206
Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, “has been interpreted to mean that in
order for a plaintiff to recover for economic losses, the plaintiff must
207
hold a property interest in what is damaged . . . .” In the Ninth Circuit,
however, commercial fishermen have recovered economic losses for
damages to fishery resources caused by pollution or oil spills under what
has been called the Oppen Exception, even though the fishermen “do
208
not possess a private property interest in the fisheries . . . .”
Finally, while fishing licenses and IFQs are not considered property
209
for a Fifth Amendment takings claim, they may be recognized as
property for other purposes. For example, several cases recognize a
property interest for the purposes of procedural due process claims. In
order to assert a procedural due process claim, there must be a
protectable liberty or property interest and a denial of adequate
210
procedural protection.
While courts have acknowledged that fishing
permits are not considered property for some purposes, they have
allowed due process challenges when permit holders allege they have

203. See id. at 644–45.
204. See, e.g., Kacy A. Collons, Comment, ITQS as Collateral Rightly Understood:
Preserving Commerce and Conserving Fisheries, 14 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 285, 321
(1996) (concluding that making ITQs compensable property rights subject to takings claims
would make them more attractive to lenders, but would also severely limit the government’s
ability to adjust these rights to achieve conservation goals).
205. Britton, supra note 191, at 225.
206. 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
207. Britton, supra note 191, at 224.
208. Id. at 225–26 (stating that Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th 1974), created
the Oppen exception).
209. See Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
Gen. Category Scallop Fishermen v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 720 F. Supp. 2d 564,
576 (D.N.J. 2010) (noting that there is no property interest in a scallop fishing permit);
Gonzalez v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 695 F. Supp. 2d 474, 504 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (holding that
plaintiffs did not show they had a property interest in federal shrimping permits subject to a
Fifth Amendment Taking).
210. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–71 (1972).
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211

suffered a deprivation without proper process.
Fishing licenses and
permits have also been considered property for purposes of attaching
212
213
tax liens and dividing marital property interests.
The issue of property rights in natural resources needs to be
governed by a uniform principle, but private property ownership is not
the appropriate model for all resources. Fish and water resources are
particularly difficult to treat as private property because of the
difficulties of excluding non-owners, their migratory nature, and their
interconnectedness with other ecosystems. To elaborate,
It is fairly easy to assign and enforce property rights to some
resources and ecosystems such as agricultural fields, trees or a
lake because excluding non-owners from using the resource is
fairly straightforward. However, it is much more difficult to
assign and enforce property rights to resources such as
migrating fish populations, biological diversity, nutrient cycles,
water cycles, and many other ecological services. The reason is
that it is either too expensive or literally impossible to exclude
non-owners from using these resources and services, partly
because they are highly interconnected with other ecosystems
214
thereby transcending several property rights regimes.

211. See, e.g., Foss v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 161 F.3d 584, 588 (9th Cir. 1998)
(“[F]or procedural due process purposes, [plaintiff] has a protectible property interest in
receiving the IFQ permit.”); LaBauve v. La. Wildlife & Fisheries Comm’n, 444 F. Supp. 1370,
1378–79 (E.D. La. 1978) (noting that although the Louisiana Supreme Court does not
recognize a property interest in a fishing license, the plaintiff had an interest sufficient to
receive due process of law before deprivation); Mertins v. Comm’r of Natural Res., 755
N.W.2d 329, 336–37 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (observing that some jurisdictions do not
recognize a property interest in fishing permits, but holding that commercial fishing licenses
are sufficient interests to be characterized “as property interests entitled to procedural-dueprocess protection under the Minnesota and U.S. Constitutions”).
212. See Jon David Weiss, A Taxing Issue: Are Limited Entry Fishing Permits Property?,
9 ALASKA L. REV. 93, 112 (1992) (concluding that because fishing permit holders may easily
transfer entry permits, these permits may be considered property subject to a federal tax
lien).
213. See, e.g., Edelman v. Edelman, 3 P.3d 348, 352 (Alaska 2000) (upholding lower
court finding that the fishing permit at issue was husband’s separate property and not part of
the marital estate); McGee v. McGee, 974 P.2d 983, 989 (Alaska 1999) (upholding lower court
treatment of fishing quota shares as divisible marital property); Johns v. Johns, 945 P.2d 1222,
1226 (Alaska 1997) (upholding trial court’s finding that husband’s Individual Fishing Quotas
(IFQs) are marital property); Ferguson v. Ferguson, 928 P.2d 597, 600 (Alaska 1996) (holding
that IFQs distributed during marriage are divisible marital property).
214. Craig, supra note 103, at 372 (quoting Robert Costanza, The Ecological, Economic,
and Social Importance of the Oceans, 31 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 199, 204 (1999)).
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As we find ourselves in a world of scarcity, regulation of these
resources at the local, national, and international levels is needed to
control overexploitation and a tragedy of the commons. This issue has
the potential for a sweeping impact on environmental cases. The
potential can be illustrated by a recent international case involving
215
lobsters poached from South African waters: United States v. Bengis.
In Bengis, the Second Circuit held that South Africa “has a property
216
interest in rock lobsters unlawfully harvested from its waters.”
However, the court based this holding not by finding lobsters to be
property, but rather by finding that since South Africa had the right to
seize and sell lobsters captured in excess of legal limits, it had a property
217
right in the revenue from lobsters taken illegally.
Even though the
United States government argued in its briefs that “South Africa’s
interest in the wild lobsters was a res publicae or public trust interest and
that such an interest qualified as a property interest under [U.S.]
restitution statutes . . . the [court] did not reach that issue, [and] instead
218
focused on the already-poached lobster.”
Thus, finding a unifying
principle for property rights in environmental resources is still
undecided, but the public trust doctrine continues to emerge as a
promising contender.
The public trust doctrine was first applied to navigable waters in
Arnold v. Mundy, where the plaintiff brought a trespass action against
219
the defendant who harvested oysters from the plaintiff’s oyster bed.
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could not prevail
because the public has rights to fish in navigable waters, which belong to
220
the state and cannot be granted to private interests. “Trust purposes
were traditionally confined to navigation, commerce, and fisheries, but
later held to include recreation and preservation of trust lands in their
221
natural state.”
The public trust doctrine has more recently been
215. 631 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2011).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 40.
218. E-mail from Michael B. Gerrard, Andrew Sabin Professor of Prof’l Practice, Dir.,
Ctr. for Climate Change Law, Columbia Law Sch., to Michael Kidd, Faculty of Law, Univ. of
KwaZulu-Natal (Feb. 3, 2011, 11:40 EST) (quoting, with permission, Marcus Asner of the
S.D.N.Y. U.S. Attorney’s Office) (on file with author).
219. 6 N.J.L. 1, 7–8 (1821).
220. Id. at 11.
221. Christian L. Marsh & Peter S. Prows, California’s New Water Legislation: A Bucket
of Reform or But a Drop?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Fall 2010, at 37, 38.
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extended by California and Hawaii to include water resources. Both
nationally and internationally, the concept of public ownership of fish
and water resources, as governed by the public trust doctrine, seems to
be the most viable framework.
V. CONCLUSION
Water allocation considerations must take into account habitat
preservation, impacts on endangered species in relation to insufficient
stream water, full utilization of available water, and allocation fairness
based on a variable water supply resulting from weather and climate
shifts.
Equipment modernization and water-treatment method
improvement may also impact how much water is sent downstream to
223
junior right holders if senior appropriators invest in new equipment.
Continued damage to the ecosystems from overexploitation of
resources, the growing demand for the resources, the uncertainty of
supply, and the improving capture technology are challenges that
require government intervention in allocation decisions.
Water and fishing rights may also conflict with each other as water is
appropriated and redirected through the building of dams, such that fish
and fish habitats are destroyed and there is a loss of fishing rights
224
because of that destruction. When rivers are dammed or overdrawn,
225
the fish population is decimated as a result. Tribal, commercial, and
222. Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 728 (Cal. 1983); In re Water Use Permit Applications
(Waiahole Ditch), 9 P.3d 409, 445 (Haw. 2000); see also Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative
Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines: Classifications of States, Property Rights, and
State Summaries, 16 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (2007) (discussing the impacts that
California public trust cases, including Mono Lake, have had on the attitudes of eastern states
in considering an expansion of their “public trust philosophies”).
223. See, e.g., Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765, 1773, 1779 (2011) (concluding that
Wyoming did not breach the Yellowstone River Compact by using more efficient irrigation
methods, which reduced the downstream flow to Montana because, under the plain terms of
the Compact and the doctrine of appropriation, Montana was not guaranteed a set quantity of
water and because Wyoming is allowed to switch to the more efficient sprinkler irrigation “so
long as no additional water is diverted from the stream and the conserved water is used on the
same acreage for the same agricultural purpose as before”).
224. See Starla Kay Roels, Borrowing Instead of Taking: How the Seemingly Opposite
Threads of Indian Treaty Rights and Property Rights Activism Could Intertwine To Restore
Salmon to the Rivers, 28 ENVTL. L. 375, 390 (1998) (“Just as the government deprived the
Causbys of the use of their property by destroying the beneficial ownership of property [as a
chicken farm], tribes cannot make use of their property because hydroelectric dams have
essentially destroyed the beneficial ownership of treaty fishing rights.” (citing United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 259, 267 (1946))).
225. See Marsh & Prows, supra note 221, at 38.
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recreational fishermen have had no recourse against the government for
resulting losses when the fish population is devastated because the loss
in fishing rights are not considered compensable property under the
Fifth Amendment. Conversely, when the government takes action to
restore fisheries by building fish ladders or requiring that water be left in
streams to support fish habitat, water users are treated as property
owners in most state and federal courts and may bring takings claims for
the deprivation of compensable water rights.
This dichotomy in treating water rights as property and fishing rights
as revocable licenses is only defensible based on case precedent that
developed along independent strands. The fishing rights cases relied on
grazing rights cases, with the American Pelagic decision holding that no
property right exists in uncaptured fish. Meanwhile, the water rights
cases relied on the real property ownership model to find property
rights in projected water availability, even though such water rights are
considered to be usufructuary in nature. Water and fish are natural
resources that should be governed by the public trust doctrine in similar
forms. When the state grants rights of access to these resources, the
rights must be considered revocable licenses subject to the state’s
responsibility to manage and conserve those resources. For the public
good, the state must be able to take back those access rights it has
previously granted, without having to pay just compensation.

